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THE APACHES IN THE HISTORY
OF THE SOUTHWEST

DONALD E. WORCESTER

THE APACHE INDIANS have played a unique role in the history
of North America despite the fact that they were always few in
number, lived widely scattered in small nomadic groups, and
rarely assembled in large numbers for any purpose. The Athapascans were apparently the last major wave into North America
before the Eskimos, for most of them are still in northwestern
Canada. Small bands of Athapascans, the forerunners of the
Apaches and Navajos, arrived in the Southwest perhaps a century
or two before the coming of the Spaniards. When Spaniards moving north from Mexico City reached the region of modem New
Mexico, they met Indians whose methods of waging war were unlike those of the sedentary peoples they had encountered earlier.
Spaniards were accustomed to people who lived in villages or cities,
who fought as armies, and who yielded when their leaders surrendered. They conquered the Aztecs, even though badly outnumbered, but they were totally unprepared for the guerrilla tactics of
the Apaches, and failed to conquer them in two centuries of warfare.
Apaches, like all Southern Athapascans, called themselves
"Dine," meaning "the people." "Apache," which may have been
a corruption of the Zuni word for "enemy," was a name the
Spaniards applied to them; like most American Indians the
Apaches became known to Europeans through neighboring tribes,
who had their own, usually unflattering, terms for them. The
Apaches were, except for the Lipans, Kiowa Apaches, and one
Jicarilla band, mountain people, although they were equally at
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home in the southwestern deserts. Unlike most Indians who occupied marginal lands, the Apaches were not too weak to force others
out of more desirable or fertile areas. They preferred their wild,
free, existence and their dependence on wild game and the roots
and seeds of·certain plants, as well as raids on sedentary peoples,
for their sustenance. Because of the constant need to search for
food, they were ever on the move.
Although living for warfare, the Apaches never attacked if the
outcome appeared uncertain. There were too few men to risk life
needlessly, and they had no esteem for dead heroes. They were
masters of stealth and surprise, and if they could not gain a decided advantage by these tactics they refrained from attacking.
The Spaniards brought new sources of food, and Apaches soon
developed a lingering taste for horse and mule meat, preferring
it to the flesh of cattle or sheep. Because they lived scattered
widely in groups of a few families, when they began raiding
Spanish herds the bands were always small.
Characteristic of the Apaches were certain traits mentioned by
many observers over the centuries-their hardiness and ability
to endure extremes of heat and cold and hunger, their scorn for
liars, the chastity of their women, their love of gambling, and their
sense of humor. Their physical fortitude and endurance were
legendary. Many writers have attested to their pride in truthfulness, and an equal number have commented, sometimes ruefully,
on the chastity of Apache women as exceptional. Parenthetically,
such chastity was greatly encouraged by the Apache practice of
cutting off the fleshy part of the nose of a woman caught in
. adultery. One example of their sense of humor was the name
they gave to bald-headed Agent John P. Clum: "Man-With-theHigh-Forehead."
The Apaches' gift for survival in a harsh environment was
also noted. They could nnd food and water where none could be
expected. And although they were always on the move, with smoke
signals by day and nres by night they could send and receive
messages over great distances in a remarkably short time, calling
others to council or warning of the approach of enemies. John C.
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Cremony, who became intimately acquainted with the Mescaleros, was astonished at their skill in concealing themselves in
open country covered only with gramma grass. 1
Beginning with Juan de Onate, the first Spanish governor of
New Mexico, who arrived with a colony shortly before 1600,
Spanish officials began seizing Apaches and selling them as slaves
in the mining camps to the south. This practice continued
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Mexicans maintained it through much of the nineteenth century. The
practice engendered bitter hatred for Spaniards, and as a result
of Apache hostility the Spanish northward advance was permanently checked at the Pueblo region of New Mexico and the
Pima and Sobafpuri villages of the Santa Cruz and San Pedro
valleys of southern Arizona. Not only was the advance checked
there, but Apache raids into Chihuahua and Sonora, from the
late seventeenth century on, pushed back the frontier and nearly
depopulated both provinces.
The Apaches were apparently the first of the wild Indians in the
present Southwest to acquire horses and to engage in mounted
combat. 2 Spaniards were authorized to employ Christianized
Pueblo Indians as herders. Some of these sought refuge with
Apaches in the 1630's and 1640'S, and no doubt taught them
to ride. Even after this the Apaches still ate most of the horses
and mules they stole from the Spaniards, keeping only a few of
the best for riding. They patterned their riding gear after that
of the Spaniards.a
There were a number of sporadic Pueblo Indian uprisings, but
it was only in 168o that a coordinated movement drove the Spaniards from the Rio Grande valley, a movement in which both
Apaches and Navajos took an active part. Only when they
learned that Apaches were actually helping the Pueblo rebels did
the Spaniards retreat. 4.
In the eighteenth century, because of their successful raids on
Spanish herds in Sonora and Chihuahua, in which they drove off
thousands upon thousands of horses, mules, and cattle, larger
numbers of Apaches were able to congregate and to participate in
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raids. Their tactics changed as a result, making their forays much
more terrifying and destructive than before. They no longer relied
on stealth, but in parties of several hundred boldly attacked
towns, ranches, and even presidios. They killed the men whenever possible, carrying off women and children either to be ransomed in New Mexico or adopted into the tribe. Many a Mexican
boy captured by Apaches grew up to become a feared warrior. In
this way the Apaches kept their numbers from declining drastically
despite constant punitive expeditions against them.
Faced with the probable loss of Sonora and Chihuahua, in 1776
the Spaniards created a new institution designed especially to cope
with the Apaches, something they had done for no other Indians.
This unique organization was the Commandancy General of the
Interior Provinces, meaning all of the northern frontier provinces.
It was a purely military jurisdiction, for the commander general's
duties were to wage constant warfare against the Apaches along
the whole frontier, a task that left him little time for civil administration. Another innovation was the campania volante or "Bying
company," a highly mobile cavalry force organized to pursue and
punish Apache raiders swiftly and effectively.
With an increased number of troops and improved firearms,
the commander general launched a determined war of extermination, using the Apaches of one band to help locate and surprise
the camps of other bands. In 1786, too, Viceroy Bernardo de
Galvez, who had served with the army in Apacheria, issued a
set of instructions to the commander general in which he introduced a new and more hopeful policy for controlling the Apaches
by tempering the extermination policy with opportunities for
making peace. Previously Spanish officials were not allowed to
make peace treaties with Apaches; now the Indians were to be
admitted to peace whenever they requested it, providing they
would locate their camps at establecimientos de paz (peace establishments) in the vicinity of one of the presidiOS. The extermination campaigns, coupled with the opportunity to live in peace
and be supplied provisions by the Spanish government, induced
many hard-pressed bands to accept peace terms. Galvez ordered
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that the Apaches be given not only food but aguardiente and even
Spanish fireanns, to make them dependent on Spanish friendship. He hoped they would give up altogether the use of the bow
and arrow. This was another new concept, for previously it had
been illegal to trade guns to Indians. 5
The new policy of intensified warfare using Apaches as scouts,
together with offers of protection and support at establecimientos
de paz, soon bore fruit, as the Chiricahuas and other bands voluntarily settled in camps near the Sonora and Chihuahua presidios.
As a result, there was a period of relative peace from about 1790
to 1830, during which time mining and ranching operations
spread along the northern frontier and into southern Arizona. It
was, for Sonora, a prosperous era, and it appeared that the
Apache problem was well on the way to solution. Even though
some recalcitrant bands still remained hostile, their own people
in the peace camps were willing to wage war against them.
After Mexican independence, however, the new nation entered
a time of troubles; supplies for the Apaches became irregular, and
military effectiveness declined noticeably. In the 1830'S the
Apaches returned to their old ways, and their raids became more
destructive than ever, reaching their peak in the 1840'S.
The dread of Apache raiders became so great in Chihuahua that
the desperate officials of that state made treaties with the Gilefio
Apache bands, treaties that excluded Sonora. Chihuahua offered
to provide food and protection for those Apaches who would return to the peace camps near the Janos presidio. The Apaches
were even allowed to sell or trade livestock stolen elsewhere. This
proved to be an attractive arrangement to some of the Gila bands,
for they had a refuge and food supply at Janos as well as opportunities for disposing of stolen animals. But after these Apaches
made several costly raids into Sonora, the Sonorans raised a force
and surprised the camps at Janos, killing many and carrying off
even more to be sold into slavery. Chihuahua officials were
furious, but the government supported Sonora.
In 1835 Sonora introduced a new and drastic method of combating Apaches, the scalp bounty system. At first bounties were
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paid only for the scalps of men, but soon payments were made
for the scalps of women and children as well, and for captives,
who were sold into slavery. Many Anglo-Americans entered the
lucrative "hair business," among them James Johnson, who lured
chief Juan Jose Compa and his Mimbrefio band to a feast, then
fired a concealed cannon into their midst. Another famous scalp
hunter was James ("Don Santiago") Kirker, the self-styled "King
of New Mexico." Scalp hunters killed or captured many Apache
women and children as well as some men, weakening especially
the Gila bands, the Mimbrefios, and the Mogollones. Bounty hunters presented hundreds of scalps for payment, but it was suspected
throughout the border that many "Apache" scalps for which they
were paid had once adorned the heads of luckless Mexican peons
or peaceful Indians. Long black hair was an invitation to disaster.
The war with Mexico brought Anglo-Americans to New
Mexico in 1846, and United States troops at first found themselves even less able to cope with Apaches than the Spaniards had
been. In the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the United
States promised to prevent Indians from crossing the border into
Mexico on raids, a promise that could not be kept without a
much more strenuous effort than the government was willing to
make. In the Gadsden Purchase of 1853 the United States took
advantage of Mexico's weakness by abrogating this agreement,
leaving the citizens of Sonora and Chihuahua as exposed as ever
to Apache depredations. A number of Apache bands lived permanently or part of each year in Mexico.
In the 1850'S troops guided by Kit Carson defeated and scattered the Jicarillas of northern New Mexico, who had less than
two hundred warriors, and other forces defeated the Mescaleros
of central and southeastern New Mexico. Both groups agreed to
keep the peace, but since the government supplied them with
only partial rations, they faced a choice between starvation and
thefts of livestock. Some of the Mimbrefios also settled down on
tributaries of the upper Gila to plant crops under the guidance of
an Indian agent, who soon considered them well on the way to
becoming self-supporting. But in 1857 Colonel Bonneville's
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Gila expedition against the Mogollones frightened them off, and
most Hed to Mexico.
The "Western Apaches," Coyoteros, T ontos, Pinalefios, and
Chiricahuas of Arizona, were willing to keep peace north of the
border if Anglos did not interfere with their time-honored raids
into Sonora and Chihuahua. Anglos had also fought the Mexicans, and they always seemed eager to trade for the cattle and
mules Apache raiders brought from Mexico, but American officials insisted that the raids must cease. To Apaches this attitude
was both arrogant and incomprehensible.
It has been traditional to blame the so-called Bascom affair at
Apache Pass in February 1861 for the intense Apache warfare
that broke out soon after. Actually, the breaking of a local treaty
in the Tubac area a few years earlier had already angered the
Apaches. The hanging of the hostages at Apache Pass, incorrectly
attributed to Lieutenant Bascom, was in retaliation for Cochise's
killing of Anglo captives; it certainly added fuel to the Hames,
but did not ignite them. The most important factor in stimulating
the sharp increase in Apache depredations north of the border
was the withdrawal of Union troops from the forts of southern
Arizona and of New Mexico in the summer of 1861 when a Confederate invasion of New Mexico was imminent. Convinced that
they had driven the troops away, the Chiricahuas, Gila Apaches,
and Mescaleros launched all-out campaigns to rid their lands of
Anglo intruders.
In 1862 Major James H. Carleton reached New Mexico with
the California Volunteers, but the Confederates had already withdrawn. Carleton, who was promoted and named military commander of the District of New Mexico, decided to keep his troops
occupied by relentless campaigns against Apaches and Navajos.
He had absolutely no mercy for Apaches-his oft-repeated instructions to his troops were to kill all the men. There were no
parleys with them; if they wanted to talk peace, their chiefs and
headmen must corne to Santa Fe to confer with Carleton in
person. But when the prominent Mescalero chief Manuelito and
his band were en route to Santa Fe in compliance with Carleton's
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inflexible demands, they met some of his troops. Manuelito and
others tried to explain their purpose, but were shot down without
warning.
As a result of Carleton's harsh policies, the destitute and virtually decimated Mescaleros surrendered and were confined on a
reservation at the desolate Bosque Redondo along the Pecos
River. Carleton had promised to return them to their own lands,
but decided instead to make them "happy" at the Bosque. It was
difficult for sick and starving Mescaleros to exhibit the happiness
Carleton demanded; his only words of consolation were that they
should be "too proud" to murmur at what could not be helped.
To make a bad situation impossible, he sent Kit Carson with a
large force to round up more than eight thousand Navajos and
add them to the Bosque Redondo reservation. The Mescaleros,
numbering less than five hundred, placed thus at the mercy of
their enemies, relished their happiness as long as they could stand
it, then fled. For several years they roamed their customary ranges,
causing no serious trouble other than occasional thefts of livestock.
In Arizona, early in 1871, some Arivaipa Apaches under chief
Eskiminzin came to Camp Grant to surrender, although the army
had no instructions for dealing with Apaches except as enemies.
Lieutenant Royal Whitman, commander at Camp Grant, welcomed them, nevertheless, and wrote a hasty request for instructions to his superiors, pointing out that it appeared possible that
many Apaches were ready to surrender. In his haste Whitman
neglected to brief the letter on the outside of the envelope as required by army regulations; some months later his letter was returned to him unread, with a terse notation calling attention to his
dereliction of duty in failing to brief it. Eventually, however, the
Apaches were allowed to remain at Camp Grant and receive food
from army stores. This was the first step away from the extermination policy in Arizona, a step the Apaches themselves initiated.
It was, however, a step that the people of Tucson resented. Their
anger increased when Whitman employed the Apaches in gathering hay and firewood for the military post, for this took money out
of the hands of contractors.
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Raids attributed to Apaches continued occasionally in southern
Arizona, and some Tucson men, together with a large number of
Papagos, slipped up on the Camp Grant Apaches and killed an
estimated eighty or more. All but eight of the slain were women
and children, and twenty-eight children were carried off to be
sold into slavery in Sonora. This attack on peaceable Apaches,
coming soon after President Grant's Peace Policy had been announced, made it clear that any Apaches on reservations would
require constant protection.
Lieutenant Colonel George Crook, who had gained fame in
the Paiute wars, and who had perfected techniques that would be
useful against the Apaches, was named commander of the Arizona
military district in June 1871. He began preparing for a winter
campaign, but had to delay it twice while Peace Policy emissaries
Vincent Colyer and General o. O. Howard tried to settle the
Apaches on reservations by persuasion. Crook resented this interference, for he was convinced that the incorrigible hostiles would
never accept reservation life until they had been thoroughly
beaten in their own favorite refuges. Many Apaches, including
Cochise and the Chiricahuas, the Mimbrefios and Mogollones,
and the Coyoteros of the White mountain region, did settle down
peacefully on the reservations Colyer and Howard established
for them. Some, but not all, worked hard to become self-sufficient.
As Crook had foreseen, however, bands of hostiles remained at
large and continued raiding.
Before he was ordered to suspend operations Crook had made
a rapid survey of Apacheria and had sent out one military detachment employing Coyotero Apaches as scouts. This was an
innovation, for the scouts employed earlier were from other
tribes. The officer in command of the detachment was most enthusiastic, saying that the Apache scouts had exceeded his "most
sanguine" expectations, and were eager to take part in the fighting. Here was the key to the conquest of the Apaches, and Crook
was quick to grasp it-using Apaches to fight Apaches, not simply
as scouts to locate hostile camps. When Colyer and Howard had
settled the majority of the Arizona and Gilefio Apaches on reser-
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vations, Crook was authorized to proceed with his plans to subdue
the hostiles.
Many of the renegades were T ontos, and Crook designed his
campaign against them by sending a number of independent
columns, crossing and recrossing their country, forcing them into
the Tonto Basin, where the final blows were struck. He chose his
officers, his Apache scouts and their white chiefs of scouts, and
his pack mules with equal care and deliberation; he informed his
officers of his intentions, then did not interfere with them. In a
few months of the hardest campaigning through the winter of
1872-1873 his columns harassed the Tontos so severely that all
but a few die-hards came to Camp Verde to surrender. In these
campaigns the companies of Apache scouts took an active part
in the fighting, and the rueful T ontos admitted that it was fear
of Apaches, not Anglo soldiers, that had driven them to surrender.
During the next few years Crook's main concern was helping
the Apaches adjust to reservation life, by keeping them busy digging irrigation ditches, farming, and raising livestock. If Crook
had remained in charge of them for ten years there probably would
have been no further serious Apache troubles. But in 1874 the
Apaches were transferred from the War Department to the Indian
Bureau, and in the following year Crook was sent to the Department of the Platte to fight the Sioux. The Apaches became pawns
in unfortunate struggles between the Army and the Indian
Bureau, for control, and between the contractors of Tucson and
New Mexico, for profits.
•
What revived Apache warfare more than anything else was the
Indian Bureau's fatal decision to concentrate most of the Apaches
at San Carlos reservation in Arizona. This policy ignored not
only all of the promises made to the various bands by Colyer and
Howard, but even worse, it cast hostile bands together on a single
reservation, thereby multiplying the possibilities for trouble. The
San Carlos region was, furthermore, distasteful to many of the
bands which had been reasonably content on reservations in their
own lands. This was especially true of the Camp Verde IndiansTontos, Apache-Yumas or Hualapais, and Apache-Mohaves or

WORCESTER: APACHES IN THE SOUTHWEST

35

Yavapais-the Coyoteros of the White mountains, the Chiricahuas,
and the Warm Spring Mimbrefios and their kinsmen, the Mogallones. Crook and other knowledgeable officers warned against
the dire consequences of this policy, but the Indian Bureau blandly ignored their warnings.
The Camp Verde Indians were the first victims of the concentration policy, for they were forced to leave their reservation,
where they had dug miles of irrigation ditches and cleared and
planted extensive fields. Their irritation was such that en route
a fight broke out between the Tontos and the other two groups
in which a number were killed and wounded. Because of army
interference at Camp Apache, the Indian Bureau ordered the
Coyoteros moved from their mountain region to the semi-desert
of San Carlos, where brash but able young John P. Clum had
successfully resisted army interference. This move placed the
Coyoteros out of range of the New Mexico contractors and within
easy reach of those of Tucson. Then came the Chiricahuas from
their reservation in southwestern Arizona, to be followed by the
Mimbrefios and Mogollones from Warm Spring reservation in
New Mexico. The Camp Verde Indians were at first troublesome,
but Clum, with his loyal Apache police and without help from
the cavalry, induced them to settle down and surrender their
weapons. Clum's ability to control the Apaches was indeed extraordinary, but his ambition caused him to promote the policy of
concentrating all Apaches at San Carlos under his own jurisdiction.
The Chiricahuas were the most dangerous of the various bands.
On his visit to Cochise's stronghold, General Howard had persuaded them to accept a reservation in their own country along the
Mexican border. At Cochise's insistence, Howard appointed his
close friend Thomas Jeffords as agent, giving him sole control
of the Chiricahuas, thereby removing them completely from
military jurisdiction. As long as Cochise lived, he and Jeffords
were able to keep the Chiricahuas in line, although they made no
effort to become self-supporting, and some of them occaSionally
joined renegades from other bands on raids into Sonora.
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Mter one such raid Skinyea, his brother Pionsenay, and others
bought whiskey from an Indian trader, and in the drunken rioting
that followed Pionsenay killed several of his people. He atoned
for this a few days later by killing the trader and his assistant,
then led a party of warriors on a rampage through the San
Pedro valley, killing a number of ranchers.
This frightening outbreak prompted widespread demands that
the Chiricahuas be moved to San Carlos or elsewhere. Because
of pressure from Governor A. P. K. Safford, the Indian Bureau
ordered Clum to effect the removal with his Apache police. Clum
insisted that troops be stationed in the area to protect citizens in
case the Chiricahuas stampeded, then marched fifty-four of his
Apaches to Tucson, where they waited for the troops to get into
position. The citizens of Tucson were so impressed by the discipline and general demeanor of the Apache police that they purchased uniforms of red shirts and white trousers for them. This
took place, it should be remembered, only five years after the
Camp Grant massacre, and one of the principal figures among the
police was the Arivaipa chief, Eskiminzin, who had lost most of
his family at Camp Grant.
Clum, his police, and a cavalry escort conducted most of the
Chiricahuas to San Carlos, but Geronimo, Juh, Nolgee, and
others of a related southern band fled into Mexico, to continue
their raiding. They frequently visited the Mimbrenos and Mogollones at Warm Spring, where they rested between raids and disposed of stolen livestock. They also drew rations from the agency.
Because of the continued raids in southern Arizona, early in
1877 the territorial legislature authorized Governor Safford to
enlist a company of sixty men to combat hostiles and protect
ranchers and miners. Safford, who, like the Tucson citizens, had
been greatly impressed by the discipline and effectiveness of the
Apache police, requested Clum to delegate sixty of them to serve
as the territorial militia. The Apache police under their white
captain, Clay Beauford, served until Clum was obliged to recall
them for another assignment of even greater importance. But the
fact that after only a few years of reservation life, and within a
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decade of the Camp Grant massacre, Apaches were called on to
protect the citizens of Arizona from other Apaches is surely one
of the most astonishing reversals of roles of the Apache wars.
Clum's assignment was to march the four hundred miles to
Warm Spring with his Apache police and to seize Geronimo,
Juh, and the other renegades. With one hundred of his police,
Clum made the capture before any troops arrived on the scene.
This w~s the only time in the Apache campaigns that Geronimo
was actually captured, although on other occasions he was persuaded to surrender and return voluntarily to the reservation. At
the time of his capture the Indian Bureau, at Clum's suggestion,
ordered him to move the Warm Spring Apaches to San Carlos
as well. Some of them fled, but those who made the unwelcome
journey took the precaution of hiding their weapons in case of
subsequent need.
On his triumphal arrival at San Carlos, Clum, who had been
enraged at the slightest army interference with reservation activities, found that in his absence the Indian Bureau had agreed
to allow the army to station troops at San Carlos to oversee his
administration. He issued an ultimatum to the Indian Bureau,
demanding a salary commensurate with his increased responsibilities and authorization to enlist more Apache police, offering
at the same time to take full responsibility for controlling all
Apaches in Arizona without any support by the army. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs did not reply to these demands, so
Clum resigned and left the Indian service. No other Arizona
Indian agent but Jeffords had Clum's gift for managing Apaches,
and within a few years all of the progress made had been jeopardized by costly outbreaks from San Carlos.
When Juh and other renegades slipped into San Carlos to
remove their families, the Warm Spring Apaches made a dash
for their homeland in New Mexico. Some surrendered"and were
taken to Warm Spring, then to Mescalero. There Victorio joined
them, apparently satisfied to remain there, but a combination of
unexpected circumstances changed his outlook. He was informed
that he was under indictment for murder in Grant County, and
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that officials would probably come to arrest him. A few days later
Judge Warren Bristol, Albert J. Fountain, and another man
crossed the Mescalero reservation on a hunting and fishing trip.
Victorio was convinced they were coming to arrest him, and fled
with his people and some Mescalero warriors. They ran off the
entire herd of cavalry horses from the Ninth Cavalry post at
Ojo Caliente.
Troops converged on southwestern New Mexico, but those
detachments that confronted Victorio's warriors did so to their
sorrow, for most were soundly thrashed. The Apaches' movements were incredibly swift, for when they wore out their
horses they quickly acquired fresh ones from ranches, and on
foot in the mountains they were as fleet and elusive as deer. On
one occasion a company of Apache scouts caught up with Victorio and part of his force, fighting an all-day battle and killing
some of his ablest warriors. Until this time he had not been
pinned down or defeated, but he could not replace his lost men,
and his fortunes suffered a steady decline thereafter. Between
1879, when he fled Mescalero, and 188 I, when Mexican troops
killed him (or he took his own life) at Tres Castillos, he eluded
or fought off thousands of troops and civilian parties on both sides
of the border in one of the most extraordinary guerrilla campaigns
in the history of warfare. After his death old Nana continued to
lead the survivors, until he, too, was run to earth.
Meanwhile, Geronimo, Juh, Chato, Nolgee and other southern
Chiricahuas carried on raids on both sides of the border, escaping,
when hard-pressed, into the impenetrable refuges of the Sierra
Madre of Sonora.
When General Crook returned to take charge of the Apache
campaigns in Arizona in 1882, he negotiated with Mexican officials for permission to pursue Apache renegades into the Sierra
Madre. By sending a large force of Apache scouts under able
officers accompanied by a few troops, he was able to induce the
Chiricahuas and their allies to surrender, but Geronimo and a
few irreconcilables slipped away at the last minute and returned
to the mountains. At this time General Nelson A. Miles replaced
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Crook as departmental commander. Miles, like many high-ranking
army officers who were unfamiliar with conditions in Arizona,
had resented Crook's reliance on Apaches for fighting men, considering it a reflection on the army's ability to defeat the Apaches.
But even though Miles was more liberally supplied with troops
than Crook had been, he soon found that without Apache scouts
he could accomplish little. He relied on them as much as necessary, but de-emphasized that fact.
Miles made himself a hero to Arizona citizens by rounding up
the peaceable reservation Chiricahuas and shipping them off to
Fort Marion in Florida. When Geronimo and those with him
fi J1 ally surrendered, they were also sent to Florida, but not to rejoin their families, as Miles had promised. As soon as Geronimo's
band was on board the train, Miles, who claimed credit for the
surrender, disarmed the Apache scouts and loaded them unceremoniously on the same train to accompany the renegades into
Florida exile. This act of treachery was widely denounced, but
the Apache prisoners of war languished in Florida and Alabama
for years. Ultimately they were sent to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and
in 1913 some were allowed to move to the Mescalero reservation
in New Mexico. They were never allowed to return to their former homelands in Arizona and the Mimbres valley of New Mexico.

WRITINGS on the Apaches began as early as 1630, when Spanish
priests such as Alonso de Benavides described them with considerable respect. 6 As the hatred between Spaniards and Apaches
grew intense, however, Spanish accounts generally denounced the
Apaches as cruel and treacherous, although they occasionally reflected grudging admiration. 7 Mter Mexican independence, Mexican accounts usually emphasized the continuous destruction of
ranches and towns, and the capture of women and children. 8
The first American accounts of the Apaches were reserved and
descriptive, such as Governor Charles Bent's report of 1846, but
when warfare broke out there were many recommendations for a
policy of removal or extermination. In the 1850'S a few men,
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such as Kit Carson, Dr. Michael Steck, and other Indian agents,
defended the Apaches and expressed conndence in their ability
to adapt and to support themselves if given the opportunity. Some
army officers in their reminiscences referred to the Apaches in
pejorative terms, but John C. Cremony also described their
abilities with unconcealed admiration. Among the men engaged
in mining and other activities in southern Arizona were both exponents of extermination, such as Sylvester Mowry and William
S. Oury, and men who believed that the Apaches were as wronged
as wrongful, such as Charles D. Poston and Raphael Pumpelly.
After the Civil War the extermination policy continued. The
attitude of General Halleck, Commander of the Division of the
Pacinc, was typical: "It is useless to negotiate with these Apache
Indians. . . . With them there is no alternative but active and
vigorous war, till they are completely destroyed, or forced to surrender as prisoners of war."9 But Lieutenant Colonel George
Crook wrote in 1871, "I think that the Apache is painted in darker
colors than he deserves, and that his villainies arise more from a
misconception of facts than from his being worse than other
Indians."lo
After the Apaches were all settled on reservations they made a
genuine effort to support themselves by farming and stock-raising,
showing early successes in both. There was, among the former
Apache warriors, much less resistance to labor than there was
among other warlike Indians, such as the Teton Sioux, when
they were reduced to reservation life and forced to give up the
bow for the hoe. If the Indian Bureau had not introduced the
unfortunate concentration policy, and if the Apaches had remained under the guidance of men like either Crook or Clum, it
seems likely that their adjustment to reservation life would have
been rapid and complete.
The earliest studies of an ethnographic nature made of the
Apaches were mostly by well-educated army officers such as Captain John Bourke, Crook's aide. Bourke's classic, On The Border
with Crook, contains a vast store of ethnological data as well as
a historical narrative of the 1870'S and 1880'S.11 These were
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followed, in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, by
scientific works of professional anthropologists such as Albert
R. Reagan,t2 the late Grenville Goodwin, Morris E. Opler, and
many others.
The Apaches have attracted a great many writers using a
variety of approaches, and an Apache bibliography would make
a substantial volume. Articles number in the hundreds; in the
first twenty-five volumes of the New Mexico Historical Review,
for example, there are twenty-nine articles with "Apache" or the
name of some Apache in the title, and these are only a part of
those that mention or deal with the Apaches. The Journal of
Arizona History and Arizona and the West also contain many
articles on Apaches. The studies of Morris E. Gpler on Apaches,
books and articles, number upwards of forty.·
Two of the early American histories containing chapters on
Apaches are J. P. Dunn, Jr., Massacres of the Mountains (1886)
and H. H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico (1889).
Dunn, .although he stated that "They are entitled to no compassion on the ground of treachery used against them. The Apache
makes war by treachery,"lS admitted that there were wrongs on
both sides. "It must be remembered ... that a large portion of the
white population were as barbarous in their modes of warfare as
the Apaches themselves; that Arizona was still a refuge for the
criminal and lawless men of other states and territories; that war
and pillage had been bred into the Apaches, until they were the
most savage and intractable Indians in the country . . . that
Mexico pursued war in the old way, and still paid bounty for
Apache scalps, no matter where procured; that slavery still existed
in Mexico, and it was next to impossible to recover Indians once
carried across the line."14
Bancroft, writing in the same period, generally regarded the
Apaches as obstacles in the way of inevitable American progress.
But in a footnote in his History of Arizona and New Mexico he
tempered his scorn of the Peace Policy advocates: "Notwithstanding my slighting allusions to Colyer's mission, it must be understood that I do not deny the truth of his allegations that the
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Apaches had been grossly wronged.... A white man's reservation, under Apache control, would be somewhat more in accordance with the eternal principles of justice than the present state
of affairs. I do not blame the Apaches for defending their homes
and liberties in their own way." He added, however, that there
was no reason that the Arizona settlers should submit to plunder
and murder. "There was," he wryly remarked, "ample room for
the application of our limited benevolence and fair treatment
after forcing the Indians to submission. "15
In the past quarter-century there have been an increasing
number of objective studies of the Apaches, and their way of life
and history are becoming better known and appreciated. Among
the more significant works are Frank Lockwood, The Apache
Indians (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938); Morris E.
Opler, An Apache Life-Way: The Economic, Social and Religious
Institutions of the Chiricahua Indians (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1941); C. L. Sonnichsen, The Mescalero Apaches
(Nonnan: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958); Jack D. Forbes,
Apache, Navajo, and Spaniard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960); F. Stanley, The Apaches of New Mexico,
1540-1940 (Pampa, Texas: Pampa Print Shop, 1962); Dan
Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacherfa (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1967) and Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches
(Nonnan: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974); Don Schellie,
Vast Domain of Blood (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1968);
Eve Ball, In the Days of Victoria: Recollections of a Warm
Springs Apache (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1972);
Max Moorhead, The Apache Frontier. Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769-1791 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968); Ralph Hedrick
Ogle, Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970); Henry F.
Dobyns, The Apache People (Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series,
1971) and The Mescalero Apache People (Phoenix: Indian
Tribal Series, 1973); and Dolores A. Gunnerson, The Jicarilla
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Apaches: A Study in Survival (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974).
This is, of course, only a partial list, but these works are representative of the studies being made of the Apaches and their
history. Unique, and in many ways one of the most valuable, is
Eve Ball's account based on her contacts with survivors of the
Apache wars and their willingness to share with her information
and memories usually concealed from whites. Too seldom has
it been possible to obtain and present much in the way of authentic information on the Apache side of the conflict.
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